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ABSTRACT 
Discovery of oil in 1956 by Shell and subsequent exploration of same, gave Nigeria the needed leverage to 
develop but existential realities, say contrary despite the huge oil wealth. In the face of this, there is immense 
struggle for the control of oil resources by the ruling class that has accentuated internal political dissension due 
to 'over reliance' on the oil economy. In the midst of this, intense minority struggle for resource space, remain 
palpable, pitching groups against selves, as a cut-throat struggle for power at the center with often ethnic 
coloration, remain evident. Consequently, national and regional development question remains largely 
unanswered in the face of the intriguing oil politics that tilt political power to plan development and actualize 
same, along strict political interest, dwarfing efforts made by successive administration to achieve positive 
development outcomes.  This paper addresses the intricate 'oil politics' in Nigeria and how same shape 
development.  
KEY WORDS: Oil rents, rent-seeking, corruption, Niger Delta, ethnicity, primordial interest, Flawed federalism 
INTRODUCTION:  
The political economy of any nation examines the interaction between the state and the market within larger 
political systems. Todaro and Smith (2009:8) sees political economy as an enquiry that “goes beyond traditional 
economics to study, among other things, the social and institutional processes through which certain groups of 
economic and political elites influence the allocation of scarce productive resources now and in the future, either 
for their own benefit exclusively or for that of the larger population as well”. Likewise Cohn, (2010:2) noted that 
International Political Economy (IPE) “is concerned with the interaction between the state, a sovereign territorial 
unit, and the market, a coordinating mechanism where buyers and sellers exchange goods and services at prices 
and output levels determined by supply and demand”. This piece examines political economy with focus on the 
dynamics of the Nigerian economy and the intricate oil politics and how same shape development.  
To be guided by elite theory as a theoretical framework of analysis, this piece is divided into three major 
sections. The first considers development and efforts made at achieving same. The second considers oil politics 
in Nigeria and how it shapes both the polity and development while the third building on the oil politics, 
explores role of the elite class in tilting the development pendulum in the light of revenue distribution and 
allocation policies embraced, considered in historical terms. Relevant Statistical evidence and historical accounts 
that supports discussed themes are introduced throughout the study to strengthen the argument. The chapter ends 
with conclusion that  the ‘oil politics’ and development interface, failed to aid the development process in 
Nigeria and suggested ways this can be mitigated.  
DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA 
The concept of development is a highly contestable one as scholars disagree on what it means. While those with 
economic background see it as improved Gross Domestic Product (GDP), others such as Sen. (1999) would have 
us view same as freedom. A careful analysis is thus needed to aptly explain the concept with a view to 
ascertaining position of Nigeria in the development discourse. To do this, this section will adopt three visions of 
development to put the concept in perspectives. Consequently, locating where Nigeria stands in the development 
discourse, development would be seen in the light of the following: 
(a) Development as historically constructed, 
(b) Development as economic improvement and  
(c) Development as holistic improvement. 
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CONCEPTUALIZING DEVELOPMENT 
“Development is an ancient concept but one which, in our modern age, has 
acquired new meaning and purpose. Its pursuit unites two strands of human 
thought: the belief in progress and the conviction that man can master his 
destiny” Pearson; (1957:6). 
 
With that opening quote, we can say that development as a concept entails the process that leads to the 
transformation of a society: at the individual or group levels. Seers (1979) see development as concerned with 
“reducing poverty, inequality and unemployment”. Seer’s view appears to agree with that held by Todaro and 
Smith (2009) where they perceived development strictly from the economic realm. Improvement in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in their view means development. Many development scholars tend to be fixated on 
economic or economistic depictions of such processes, as defined through economic indicators such as the 
Human Development Index, or per capita income measures. However, this dominant conceptualization in the 
view of many does not capture the full diversity of potential interpretations and, in particular, the role of history 
in such imagination.  
As an academic concept, development is better understood if its historical origin is traced. The term first 
appeared in literatures immediately after the Second World War. In particular, it was politically codified by the 
Marshall Plan of 1947 and made popular by ‘point four’ in President Truman’s famous speech. That speech 
established a difference between development and underdevelopment. Though the difference between the two 
terms remains ambiguous till date as scholars have continued to build on what they conceive of both terms. As 
Rist (2010:71) noted while building on the historical trajectory of the term, “…point four inaugurated the 
‘development age’ and significantly enough, it was proclaimed by a president of the United States.” Initially the 
term referred to rebuilding ruined economies in the Second World War; later, the plan provided the platform for 
rendering support for less developed countries. The ‘lack’ of development was more manifest in what later 
became known as ‘third world countries’.  
According to Thirlwall; (2003:29), “the development of the third world, entail the eradication of primary 
poverty”. Poverty again, can be subjectively considered as taste varies among individuals. However, in response 
to the growing poverty rate in the world at this time, the World Bank responded through the Pearson’s report of 
1969 by acknowledging that “the widening gap between the developed and developing countries has become the 
central problem of our time”. What this assertion did was to make all realize that underdevelopment is a global 
challenge which spurred interest in development economics. The term underdevelopment on its own is 
problematic since it is difficult to pin down what actually pass for underdevelopment because of the relativity of 
the term. To place the concept of development in perspective, the three identified visions of development earlier 
noted, will guide this study.  
Development as historically constructed  
Ideas postulated by modernization theory form the basis of this perception of development. Clark et al 
(2013:172) while commenting on modernization theory, holds that “all societies pass through the same historical 
stages of economic development. The claim in the aftermath of World War II decolonization was that 
contemporary underdeveloped countries were merely at an earlier stage in this linear historical process of 
development than more developed countries.” This painted an historical dimension of the definition of 
development which Escobar (1995:5) conceived “historically constructed’ in line with modernization 
postulations. To him, “development as a historically produced discourse entails an examination of why so many 
countries started to see themselves as underdeveloped in the early post- World War II period”, that made “how to 
develop became a fundamental problem for them, and how, finally, they embarked upon the task of un-
underdeveloping themselves by subjecting their societies to increasingly systematic, detailed, and comprehensive 
interventions”.  Though the views above captures the historical dimension of development, they however failed 
to balance the argument, as they merely whipped up North-South sentiment, reminiscent of Said’s (1979) 
orientalism in the development discourse. If history of development leads to history, it must not necessarily lead 
to trading blames because different historical projections, underlie different countries’ developmental strive. It is 
thus necessary to see development with other lenses as earlier noted.  
Development as economic improvement 
This chronicle views of scholars that associated development with economic improvement. Offering an 
economic definition of development, Todaro and Smith (2009:14) argue that it expresses “the capacity of a 
Journal of Energy Technologies and Policy                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3232 (Paper)   ISSN 2225-0573 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.12, 2014 
 
72 
national economy, whose initial economic condition has been more or less static for a long time, to generate and 
sustain an annual increase in its Gross National Income (GNI) at rates of 5% to 7% or more”. In a similar 
manner, Thirlwall (2003) has equated development to economic development when he remarks that it should be 
“thought of in terms of the expansion of entitlements and capabilities, which are not well captured by aggregate 
measures of output growth”. While Kuznets; (1973:255) argued that “developments required high rates of 
growth of per capita Gross National Product (GNP), of population and of total factor of productivity (especially 
labour productivity)”. Increased GNI espoused by Todaro and Smith as previously seen, expands ‘entitlement 
and capability’, which Thirlwall see as development. What these definitions did, is to simply judge states as 
developed if their economic performance improves over time. The economic conception of development 
dominates contemporary development literatures and has enjoyed vantage publicity as development scholars see 
increases in per capita income and GDP of countries as sufficient indicators of development. Though this 
definition portrays the economic dimension as a way of knowing what development entails, it is however a 
problematic, because it failed to factor disparity in population and resource power of countries into the 
calculation. Does the improved economic lot of a few individuals translate to general development? There is thus 
the need to see development more broadly.  
Development as holistic improvement 
This version of development sees it as “a multi-dimensional process, one that changes the economy, polity and 
society of the country in which it occurs,” Kambhampati; (2004:12). Scholars with this perception see 
development beyond mere improvement in the economic condition of a country but sees same to have occurred 
when “general improvement and measurable change in the life of an individual, group or a nation.” Sen’s (1999) 
definition of development as “a process of expanding the freedoms that people enjoy” broadened the 
development discourse beyond history and economic improvement. Though ‘development is freedom’ is 
ambiguous, but this finds an explanation in Rist’s (2010:13) conception that development entails the ability to 
reproduce a society when he said “development consists of a set of practices, sometimes appearing to conflict 
with one another, which require - for the reproduction of society - the general transformation and destruction of 
the natural environment and social relations. Its aim is to increase the production of commodities (goods and 
services) geared, by way of exchange, to effective demand.” like Sen, he saw development beyond both 
historical contraction and economic conjectures which agrees with Seers; (1969) that holds that ‘development 
cannot be said to have happened when variables such as unemployment, poverty and inequality increases’.  
An improved economy may in fact benefit only a few individuals while burdening many with ‘unfreedoms’ as 
Sen would express it. Unfreedom comes when individuals lack they need to enjoy freedom. Thirlwall (2003) 
summed this up when he observed that the essence of development is “to provide people with the basic necessity 
of life, for their sake, and to provide a degree of self-esteem and freedom for people, which are precluded by 
poverty’. Development can be said to exist when a country is unable to provide for self and its population (self-
sustenance), lacks self-worth/independence (self-esteem), and is encumbered by daily survival needs (unfree). 
Absence of the trio as Goulet noted, means achieving development for a nation, (Goulet 2006). This is the 
situation in many LDCs with Nigeria as no exclusion as self-sustainability, self-esteem and freedom using the 
lens provided by both Sen and Goulet, is not reflected in the life of the people as per capita income and human 
development index in most LDCs, remain low as it is in Nigeria. There is thus lack of development in 
commensurate terms in Nigeria, what are then the steps taken to address this? The next section considers various 
plans aimed at achieving development over time.  
DEVELOPMENT PLANS IN NIGERIA 
 
According to Todaro and Smith; (2009), development plans evolve from economic planning in a country and it 
entails “ deliberate government attempt to coordinate economic decision making over the long run and to 
influence, direct, and in some cases even control the level and growth of a nation’s principle economic variables 
(income, consumption, employment, investment, saving, export, import, etc.). This plays key role accelerating 
economic growth and development of any nation.  
 
Development planning in Nigeria dates back to the colonial era when in 1946, the ten (10) years welfare and 
development plan initiated by the colonial administration was embraced. This plan billed to merely distribute the 
colonial welfare funds, achieved very little Ikelegbe; (2003), Abidde; (2012) and Henley et al; (2012).  
 
Non-participation of Nigerians in the planning process, have been adduced for the poor showing of these plans. 
Other development subsequent plans were the five (5) years colonial development plans (1955 – 1960), First 
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National Development Plan (1962 – 1968), and the Second National Development Plan (1970 –1974). Others 
included the third National Development Plan (1975–1980) and the Fourth National Development Plan (1981 – 
1985), all geared toward arresting the underdevelopment malaise that plagues the nation. As revealed in table 4 
below, all these plans failed to achieve desired result for sundry reasons listed against each plan.  
 
More recent steps taken to bring about development of the nation through development planning can be seen in 
the domesticated measure meant to realize the United Nation’s (UN) inspired Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) in Nigeria. That initiative is what the Nigerian government referred to as National Economic 
Empowerment and Development Strategy, (NEEDS) established in 2004. The NEEDS document and initiative, 
placed primacy on agricultural evolution to break the nucleus of alleged economic stagnation said to be  
crippling the nation crippled in the face of enormous oil wealth. According to the Nigerian National Planning 
Commission (2004), “The goal of NEEDS is to mobilize the resources of Nigeria to make a fundamental break 
with the failures of the past and bequeath a united and prosperous nation to generations to come; (Need 
Document).  NEEDS was orchestrated by the failure of previous efforts aimed at achieving development through 
planning. At the state and local government levels, NEEDS is replicated as State’s Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy, (SEEDS) and Local Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (LEEDS) 
respectively.  
 
While development plans in Nigeria reveal that they were well intentioned, they however failed to achieve pre-
conceived aims Ikelegbe; (2003), Abidde; (2012) and Henley et al; (2012). Apart from the five years colonial 
development plan and the First National Development plans that achieved 4% and 5% annual growth rate 
respectively, the other plans failed to achieve meaningful result. The on-going NEEDS initiatives meant to rail-
road the nation to the path of development between 2000-2015 when the MGDs are expected to be achieved, 
keep all guessing as to whether there would be a break from previous plans. Plan failure in Nigeria according to 
Imhanlahimhin; (2000:93), is due to “restriction of planning to the economic aspects of life at the expense of 
other aspects such as political, social and cultural with particular reference to human development”. Comparing 
development planning in Nigeria to what obtains in Indonesia, Henley et al; (2012) noted thus about the Nigerian 
planning mechanism: 
 
“vision of development was not inspired by a concern with providing mass 
industrial employment for the poor - nor even, apparently, by a faith in the 
‘spill over’ or ‘growth pole’ effects of industrial development on those parts 
of the economy which did benefit the poor. Instead, the issues which 
interested the Nigerian technocrats most were more technical and elitist in 
character: value added, skill acquisition, technology transfer, indigenous 
ownership, and regional equity”.   
 
Issues raised by the scholars, can be likened to that of one sided planning Imhanlahimhin raised. This in essence 
means that from the planning process, the people are alienated from the developmental process because of the 
elitist posture. However, position of Henley et al; (2012) failed to capture the internal dynamics in Nigeria. 
Issues of literacy level and general political apathy, mar robust planning process in Nigeria. The question this 
poses is that of what led to the lackadaisical planning attitude? How can this be explained within the framework 
of elite and resource curse theorization?  
 
Comparatively, Nigeria’s development drive has failed to achieve desired result compared with other countries 
because the various plans, failed to achieve desired results as chronicled in the table below.  
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TABLE 4: GLOSSARY OF DEVELOPMENT PLANS IN NIGERIA, 1946-2011 
PLANS                         TARGET                   ACHIEVEMENT                  WHY IT FAILED 
TEN YRS 
COLONIAL 
DEV PLAN, 
1946-61 
ALLOCATE 
DEVELOPMENT AND 
WELFARE  
FUNDS MADE 
AVAILABLE BY THE 
COLONI 
AUTHORITIES 
SET THE BALL ROLLING 
FOR DEV PLANN- 
ING AND LAID 
FOUNDATION FOR 
INDUST 
RIAL GROWTH 
FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE 
PRODUCTIVE  
SECTOR, POOR FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES 
WEAK FORMULATION AND 
IMPLEMENTA 
TION MECHANISM, ABSENCE OF 
FOCUS 
1ST 
NATIONAL 
DEV 
PLAN, 1962-
68 
TO ACHIEVE 
ECONOMIC 
DEVELOMENT OF 
THE COUNTRY 
CREATED NATIONAL 
MAN-POWER BOARD 
CONSOLIDATED 
PLANNING PROCESS BY 
GIVING ATTENTION TO 
HUMAN ELEMENT 
INADEQUATE PLANNING TIME, 
LACK OF  
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, DEARTH 
OF TECH 
NOCRATS TO EXECUTE THE PLAN, 
POLIT- 
ICAL INSTABILITY THAT LED TO 
THE 1966 
COUP 
2ND 
NATIONAL 
DEV 
PLAN, 1970-
74 
ACHIEVE 
UNITED,SELF-
RELIANT, 
DEMOCRATIC AND 
ECONOMICALLY 
EGALITARIAN STATE 
STRENGTHENED 
PLANNING MECHINERY 
IN NIGERIA 
LACK OF FINANCE AND POLITICA 
WILL  
IMPLEMENT THE PLAN,  MONO-
CULTURAL 
STATE OF THE ECONOMY 
3RD 
NATIONAL 
DEV 
PLAN, 1975-
80 
ECONOMIC 
DIVERSIFICATION, 
REDUCE 
UNEMPLOYMENT, 
EVEN DISTRIBUTION 
OF INCOME 
HELPED ENHANCE 
LIVING STANDARD OF  
THE COMMON MAN 
WITH BY FOCUSING 
ON AGRICULTURE, 
WATER, HOUSING, 
HEALTH CARE 
DELIVERY. 
CHANGE OF GOVT, FINANCIAL 
PAUCITY, 
POOR IMPLEMENTATION  
4TH 
NATIONAL 
DEV 
PLAN, 1981-
85 
ESTABLISH LONG 
TERM ECONOMIC 
AND 
SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
HELPED ACHIEVED 
BROAD BASED PARTIC 
IPATION IN THE 
PLANNING PROCESS 
REGIME CHANGE, FINANCIAL 
PAUCITY, 
INADEQUATE FORECAST BY 
PLANNERS 
NATIONAL 
ROLLING 
PLAN (SAP), 
1986-93 
SHIFT ATTENTION 
FROM PROJECT-
BASED 
POLICY-BASED 
ECONOMIC 
PLANNING  
SYSTEM, EVALUATE 
THE FIXED 
PLANNING  
THAT HITHERTO 
EXISTED 
HELPED ENCOURAGE 
PRIVATE-SECTOR 
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 
ECONOMIC PRO 
CESS AS OPPOSED TO 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
DOMINANCE. 
LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT DUE 
TO THE 
AUSTERITY MEASURE 
INTRODUCED, 
REGIME CHANGE, FAILURE TO 
IDENTIFY 
PRIORITY AREAS. 
VISION 
201O: 
1996-2010 
(ABACHA) 
IMPROVE QUALITY 
OF LIFE OF 
NIGERIANS, 
LARGE SCALE 
ECONOMIC 
DEREGULATION, 
LED TO A DEARTH OF 
INVESTMENT IN INF 
RASTRUCTURAL 
FACILITIES, JOB LOSS,  
CAUSED HARDSHIP 
FAILURE TO RELEASE FUNDS FOR 
PROJEC 
TS, POOR IMPLEMENTATION 
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NATIONAL 
ECONO- 
MIC 
DIRECTION, 
1999-2003 
ACHIEVE STRONG, 
VERILE AND BROAD- 
BASED ECONOMY, 
ALLEVIATE POVERTY 
AND PROVIDE 
IMPROVED 
BUREAUCRACY 
FAILED TO ACHIEVE 
TANGIBLE RESULT AS 
PARTY DOMINATED 
POLITICSANCHORED  
ON RED-TAPISM, 
MESSED THE PLAN 
IMPROPER ARTICULATION OF THE 
PLAN, 
LACK OF FUNDS, DIVISIVE PARTY  
POLITICS, POOR IMPLEMENTATION 
NATIONAL 
ECONO- 
MIC 
EMPOWER- 
MENT 
STRATEGY, 
(NEEDS I), 
2003-2007 
CREATE NEW 
NIGERIA VIA VALUE 
RE-OR 
IENTATION AND 
ERADICATE 
POVERTY VIA 
EMPLOYMENT 
GENERATION, 
WEALTH 
CREATION 
ACHIEVED STRUCTURAL 
REFORMS SUCH 
AS BANK REFORMS, 
GROWTH OF NON- 
OIL 
SECTOR,LIBERALIZED 
IMPORT TARIFF 
REGIME AND 
INTRODUCED 
WHOLESALE 
DUTCH AUCTION 
SYSTEM 
LACK OF POLITICAL WILL TO 
FAITHFULLY 
IMPLEMEMT THE PLAN, POOR 
INFRAST- 
RUCTURAL BASE, SOLE 
DEPENDENCE ON 
OIL REVENUE, IMPORT 
DEPENDENT 
ECONOMY 
NEEDS II 
2007 
TACKLE 
EMPLOYMENT AND 
JOBCREATION 
SERVED AS A SOLACE 
TO THE FAILURE 
OFNEEDS I 
LACK OF COORDINATION AS SEEN 
INNEEDS I 
7 POINTS 
AGENDA 
2007-2010 
ACHIEVE 
DEVELOPMENT WITH 
FOCUS ON 
INFRASTRUCTURE, 
FOOD SECURITY, 
HUMAN CAPITAL 
DEV., WEALTH 
CREATI- 
ON,SECURITY, NIGER 
DELTA & LAND TEN- 
& HOME OWNERSHIP 
BROUGHT RELATIVE 
PEACE TO THE NIGER 
DELTA REGION, 
ACHIEVED 
APPRECIABLE  
IMPROVEMENT IN 
ELECTRICITY GENERA- 
TION. 
DEATH OF PRESIDENT YAR'ADUA, 
LACK OF CLARITY  
OF PURPOSE THAT CLOUDED THE 
PLAN 
VISION 
20:2020 
2011-20:2020 
MAKE NIGERIA ONE 
OF THE 20TH ECONO- 
MY IN THE WORLD 
BY THE YEAR, 2020 
ON-GOING AMIDST 
UNCERTAINTY 
LIKELY TO FAIL IF NOT PROPERLY 
PILOTED 
 
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation. 
WHY DEVELOPMENT PLANS FAILED IN NIGERIA 
A plan is said to have failed if it “fails to achieve predestined goal”. Development plans in Nigeria can be said to 
have failed due to the following factors.  
Firstly, lack of inclusive planning mechanism embraced. For any plan worth supporting to succeed, it must 
involve the people who apart from supporting to succeed, will abide by every spirit of because every plan comes 
in clothed with law. There is thus need for wide consultation to accommodate views of as many as possible to be 
able to cater to expected diverse interest in the society, especially ethnically diverse nation like Nigeria’s.  
Secondly, development plans fail in Nigeria due to lack of political will to implement them. As Henley et al; 
(2012) observed this led to the failure of development plans in Nigeria to achieve set goals.  
Thirdly, development planning in Nigeria, fails due to skewed planning scope. By this we mean the failure of the 
various development plans to focus on key sector of the economy such as agriculture and investment to drive the 
development process.  
Finally, development plans failed to achieve set goals in Nigeria because of frequent plan and regime change. 
Available record shows that the fortune of development planning in Nigeria nose-dived due to regime change. 
This can be seen from the departure of the Nigerian state from the already established periodic planning culture 
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of five years interval in 1988 by the Babangida administration. Budget based development measures that failed 
to achieve tangible result, was thus adopted.  
From what we have seen, Nigerian development fails to measure up with global average and as such, the nation 
is seen as LDC. Efforts at arresting underdevelopment, failed to yield expected results due to aforementioned 
reasons. In essence, these factors especially frail and centralized institutional framework, contributed to the 
delayed development of the nation because no nation can truly develop aside an articulated plan to achieve 
specific economic goal at a particular time. Plan jettisoning, led to truncation of national development quest. We 
can thus locate this within the parameters politics played in the development debate. In the next section, the 
intricate position of oil politics will be explored to identify areas where oil politics vitiated developmental 
efforts.  
OIL AND POLITICS IN NIGERIA 
Oil as a natural resource of great economic value occupies prime attention in global politics; hence countries rely 
on it as means of economic survival. To this end, control of these resources, attracts political maneuvering found 
in any political system, especially resource rich and dependent countries. In Nigeria, oil and politics are 
inextricably linked as political leaders; see the control of oil resource as the ultimate control of political power. 
Consequently, there is intense contestation for political power and by extension, the control of oil resources of 
the nation (Ikelegbe, 2005) and (Obi, 2010). This made issue of oil and politics in Nigeria, a vexatious one. As 
Omoweh; (2005:50) observed, “the new found oil wealth in Nigeria introduced a new dimension into the 
country’s character of politics, particularly the intensification of the fierce struggle to capture and privatize the 
state at all cost and by all means by the political class”.  Subsequently, this played out to the detriment of the 
economy as “roving bandits with the smash and grab mentality” dominated Nigerian political landscape (Lewis, 
2010:20). End result unfortunately, was poor development planning and where there is one, lack of the political 
will to faithfully see it through, (Henley et al, 2012). 
To understand the weight oil and politics carries in the political economy of the Nigerian state, this piece will 
briefly consider the following sub-topic with a view to exploring in compact form, how ‘oil and politics 
interface’ shape the Nigerian political cum developmental process. Consequently, focus will be on issue of 
revenue allocation and the kind of politics it spurns and how same shape development.  
OIL AND THE POLITICS OF REVENUE ALLOCATION 
This is one issue that shows manifestation of oil politics in Nigeria. It entails processes that have to do with how 
oil revenues are shared in the Nigerian federal system that is fraught with politics seen in the struggle between 
and among the largely dominated ethic interest in Nigeria. According to Ikeji; (2011), “the struggle for the 
control of the nation’s resources have also, to some extent been based on the regional cleavages”.  The Nigerian 
state is made up of six geo-political zones with three dominant ethnic groups alongside numerous minority 
groups seen mostly among the oil bearing Delta region and the middle belt. There is obvious political struggle 
for oil wealth as each region often represented by an ethnic group, angle for ample resource space. One way this 
is made known, is how benefits are allocated from generated revenue in the revenue sharing formula that is seen 
to be a political instrument to press for advantage. 
Revenue allocation principles adjudged skewed in favour of major ethnic groups at the expense of minorities, 
gained currency following the discovery of oil and exploration of same in commercial quantities in the 1953s. 
Prior to oil, revenue sharing formula that adopted derivation principle, paid regions from where applicable 
resources were sourced, 50% of the total revenue generated. This was however short-lived as the derivation 
principle was though retained, but applicable percentage kept dropping in the following sequence. It changed 
from 50% to 25% between 1968-1980 and miserable 1.5% between 1980-1989, (Akpabio and Akpan 2010) 
when oil was discovered. The politics that followed and later came to be known as the politics of revenue 
sharing formula as we earlier observed, is seen by many as direct political war between majority tribes and the 
minority tribes for the soul of the Nigerian oil.  This to a very large extent amplifies what has come to be seen as 
oil politics in Nigeria.  
Subtle and overt moves by regions to have fairer share in the revenue sharing regimes as well as the twist and the 
rancor that followed, which manifest in the polity, what many call ‘politics of oil’ in Nigeria (Ikelegbe, 2005, 
Obi, 2010, Ikeji, 2011, Omeje, 2006, Yusuf-Bagaji et al, 2011 and Higgins, 2009). The Nigerian federal system 
largely seen as flawed comes readily to mind when the issue of oil politics in Nigeria is up for analysis. This is 
particularly of interest when seem from the prism of distributive justice in the distribution of Nigeria oil 
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resources wherein acceptable formula for sharing oil wealth, has remain an issue. Minority groups in Nigeria 
have severally seen issues associated with revenue sharing in Nigeria as a struggle to outdo the majority to outdo 
them by espousing unfavourable revenue sharing formula from the center government dominated largely by the 
majority tribes of Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba. Effort at amending the nation’s constitution recently, exposed the 
regional dimension of the angling for the soul of oil money. While governors of the oil rich South-South region 
wanted increased allocation, those of the North, wanted the status quo of 13% the South-South presently enjoys, 
to remain. As Agbo; (2013:19-20) noted, 
“The 1999 constitution provides for at least 13 per cent derivation to oil 
producing states. Due to the agitation of the oil bearing communities for 
more it was proposed in the ongoing constitution amendment process for 
derivation to be increased to 20 per cent. This was rejected by 224 votes to 
125. This is another interest of the South-South rejected by the North.”  
 
What comes to mind is the subtle but fierce regional struggle for oil resources with majority ethnic groups seen 
to be muzzling minorities with their numerical strength. By implication, development is thus removed from oil 
bearing communities as the funds that comes to them, remain insufficient to cope with the negative externality of 
oil production.  
The table below captures transmutation of the revenue sharing formula over time in Nigeria and how it reflected 
absence of distributive justice. This is because as earlier observed, when it was agricultural, the operational 
sharing principle was that of derivation and the regions producing the resources, had 50% of whatever they 
produced. This became 1.5% in 1989. It took intense struggle by the oil bearing minority of the Delta for this to 
reluctantly alter to the present 13%.  This shows the political rivalry of vested interest in the Nigerian oil wealth 
which again, reflects the commonsensical understanding of what politics means which is “struggle for power to 
administer the commonwealth”. 
TABLE 5: DERIVATION REVENUE SHARING FORMULA IN NIGERIA 
 
Source: Researchers’ computation from various referenced sources. 
From above, one can notice a gradual reduction in the percentage of sharing the revenue based on derivation 
principle. It became manifest when oil became the mainstay of the nation’s economy as earlier years showed 
robust revenue share for regions that produced the resources. Ironically, these regions were dominated by major 
ethnic groups. The table turned when minorities started producing revenue that sustained the nation. The politics 
and intrigue that follows, shows the deep seated politics associated with the exploration of oil in Nigeria. It is in 
line with this, that this study will subsequent chapter, test adopted hypothetical statement that “lopsided Federal 
structure undermines equitable distribution of resources which leads to underdevelopment in politically less 
powerful regions” 
OIL, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT 
Apart from the usually cited resource curse effect that appear to have denied Nigeria commensurate 
development, the debilitating role of politics in the oil industry, appears to have equally contributed. Intricate 
mingling of politics with oil curse, appear to interact to the detriment of the nation and at the expense of 
envisaged development at the discovery of oil in 1956. Evidence of these manifests in many ways as this seeks 
to explore. Here, effort would be made to carefully analyze the interplay of oil, politics and development in 
CRITERIA 
 
YR/SHARING % 
  
SHARING % 
  
1954-1959 1968-1980 1990-1999 1999-2012 
POPULATION 
  
50 40 30 
NEED 
     BALANCED DEV 
  
50 40 40 
DERIVATION 
 
100 25 1.5 13 
LAND AREA 
 
100 
  
10 
SOCIAL DEV. 
   
15 10 
INTERNAL DEV. 
   
5 10 
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Nigeria. At the end of this, we would be enable us understand how oil politics encourage or discourage 
development in Nigeria. 
HOW OIL POLITICS SHAPES NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENT 
First, the discovery of oil and creation of the Nigerian oil industry and the politics that followed plunged the 
nation into rent-seeking. This culminated in the attendant resource curse malaise that became the lot of the oil 
rich state. While oil rents should be seen as a tool for economic growth via investment to achieve development 
that which accrued to the Nigerian state was seen by the political class as what they should fight for at the 
detriment of development. Ikelegbe (2005) captured this in his piece where he chronicled the political economy 
of rents in the Nigerian oil industry. He however failed to expose the character of the Nigerian political elites 
that fuels rent-seeking at development expense. The Nigerian elite as would be explored briefly in subsequent 
sections, is to say the least, corrupt. As Nwabuzor (2006) noted, corruption fuels the culture of rent-seeking and 
fritters away development.  
Consequently, accruable oil rents become insufficient to meet the nation’s developmental targets. In such 
situation, development goals become unachievable both at the national and at the regional level. This runs 
contrary to what happens in the 1960s where agro based resources sustained the economy. Discovering of oil 
came with it a new brand of politics which we considered as the politics of revenue allocation in previous 
section, tended to erode developmental gains of the oil rich state. This helped plunged the nation into rent-
seeking and frustrated ability of the state to plan since ‘roving bandits’, took over the machinery of the state, 
Lewis (2010). This apart from making it impossible for oil wealth to impact the nation in development terms; 
creates the atmosphere of rancor that accentuates crisis owing to grievance arising from the inequality in the 
sharing of oil resources. Distributive injustice is singled out as the main cause of the Niger Delta crisis (Ikelegbe, 
2005, Obi, 2010, Ikeji, 2011, Omeje, 2006, Yusuf-Bagaji et al, 2011 and Higgins, 2009). The end result is the 
disruptive effect of oil and politics dynamics that has led to the seeming failure of oil wealth to positively impact 
the development process in Nigeria. 
Secondly, oil-politics dynamic and impact of same on the Nigerian state, has led to the neglect of key sectors of 
the economy capable of helping the nation navigate the path of development. Elite induced struggle for oil 
wealth laced with primordial interest, made it possible for the nation and managers of state affairs, to neglect key 
sectors of the economy capable of engendering development. The prime casualty here is the agricultural sector 
that once sustained the economy. Self-interest with regional and ethnic coloration that dominated the Nigerian 
political scene after the discovery and exploration of oil was to later manifest in the management of oil wealth. 
The manifestation of the political impact on the economy owing to the oil politics was the inchoate planning 
environment that failed to help the nation achieve needed development. The nation became largely dependent on 
oil to the neglect of other sectors that could drive development process. This contrasted sharply with the agro 
sector based economy that existed immediately after independence that saw healthy competition among the 
regions. The West built the coca house in Ibadan among other things , the North build Ahmadu Bello University 
in Zaria while the East concentrated on the development of Enugu as their model of development. Development 
at the regional levels took root from this but such gains were reversed with the avoidable struggle for oil that 
accompanied the oil economy.  Gradual alteration of the revenue allocation formulae to the detriment of oil 
bearing region and eventual abandonment of the lands, crippled regional efforts at developing.  Planning was not 
spared as it was politicized (Henley et al 2012). 
Thirdly, oil politics in Nigeria, brought about corruption in a new dimension. As expected, this came with 
disruptive effects on the nation’s developmental efforts. With oil and the struggle for the control of same, new 
class of state actors emerged. They emerged with clientelistic mindset ostensibly to amass wealth at the expense 
of the state. While this happen, national interest is seen as secondary but regional and often times, primordial 
interest, given a vent. With corruption closely linked to the resource curse debate that the Nigerian state suffers 
from, (Shaxson, 2007), one can then situate the problem of corruption in the Nigerian oil dominated economy 
properly. Seen as abuse of trust for personal gains, corruption has been defined by Nwabuzor; (2005) as “the 
outright diversion and conversion of public funds to private use by public officials; the bribery of public officials 
by multinationals or private sector entities as inducement to obtain government patronage and contracts; and the 
extension of money and other consideration by public officials as condition for awarding the same patronage”.  
What this means is that, corruption is an unethical conduct by those saddled with responsibility of public trust at 
the expense of public interest. This depicts exactly what happens in the Nigerian oil industry that is prone to 
political manipulation.  
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Corruption is disruptive anywhere anytime but oil related corruption as in the case of Nigeria, has a far more 
damaging impact on the nation’s economy and development process. Corruption in the oil sector in Nigeria as 
Gillies; (2009) noted, “manifest in the award of oil licenses, avoidable bottlenecks in the oil industry, shabby 
process of crude oil sale and import of refined products and that associated with accounting for accruable 
revenue from the sale of oil in Nigeria.” These tend to accentuate and fuel corrupting tendency amongst public 
officials as they see corrupt enrichment of selves at the expense of the state, as their opportunity to partake of the 
‘national cake’. Such thinking, receives impetus from strong primordial attachment that thrives on ethnic 
sentiment. This is the story of oil politics in Nigeria especially when oil wealth, fuels corruption and patronage 
politics that have national development prostrate, Obi; (2010).  
Finally, oil politics in Nigeria, led to infrastructural decay.  With the mix-up of politics and oil, the resultant 
effect is the “smash and grab” mentality that elites adopts (Henley et al, 2012). This can be likened to idea of 
“roving bandits” which Olson; (2000) espoused, mentioned by (Lewis, 2010) as manifest in Nigeria. While the 
nation basked in the euphoria of oil discovery with renewed hope of improved infrastructural facilities, the 
reverse turned out to be the case. This can be seen from the manifest neglect of infrastructural facilities where 
they exist. Roads in the oil bearing region of the Niger Delta are reportedly in bad shape as it is the case in 
several parts of the nation despite the huge amount budgeted yearly for their construction and repairs. Where 
they exist, there is manifest failure of the state to maintain such infrastructural facilities, leading to inevitable 
decay. From poorly maintained roads, poor health facilities, near non-functional social services, epileptic power 
supplies, comatose industrial base and manufacturing sector and so much more, the Nigerian state is marked by 
dearth of infrastructure worsened by poor maintenance culture. Misplaced priority of the ruling elites who are 
often drawn into the struggle for oil wealth that leaves them engrossed with what they can grab from the national 
cake which the oil wealth represents and not how to develop the nation, make this so. We can thus say that the 
willful neglect of infrastructural facilities in Nigeria represents the flip-side of oil politics in Nigeria 
IS NIGERIA PLAGUED BY OIL CURSE? 
While one expects resource rich states to do well in terms of development and consolidate democracy, this is 
scarcely the case, (Schubert, 2006). Nigeria with large deposit of oil resources as evidence from the regions 
show, perform below expectation. Mexico and Norway as well as Canada are however exception. That disparity 
exists between natural resources and well-being in oil rich states and the likelihood of crisis for the control of the 
resources; paints a picture of possible resource curse in resource rich but poor states. Averting this according to 
(Lipset, 1981), is by investing in key economic variables that can drive the economy (Birdsall et al, 2004 and 
Ottaway, 2005). There is thus need to shore up the investment drive in Nigeria to drive the development process.  
Though available indicators shows traces of resource curse in Nigeria, there is need to avoid formation of 
spurious correlation between natural resource and economic growth. Economic growth like we have earlier seen 
entails employing core economic principles of saving and investment to drive the development process. This was 
what (Thirlwall; 2003) espoused when the observed that development “is concerned with economic, cultural and 
political requirements for effecting rapid structural and institutional transformation of the entire society in a 
manner that will bring the fruit of economic progress to the broadest segment of their population”. What this 
means is that natural resources are simply not enough to drive the development process but structural and 
institutional frameworks, have roles to play. In the light of this, the Nigerian case can thus be seen as presenting 
a peculiar case since the role of development institutions and those manning it, needs a careful appraisal. That’s 
takes attention to the role of the elite class that manages state institutions to either achieve development or enrich 
selves at the expense of needed development.  
THE NIGERIAN ELITE 
"There are endless assertions about the political dominance of the "rich," the 
"landlord class," the "economic oligarchy" and for the Latin American 
countries; there is a mass of polemical prose about the various kinds of 
exploitive alliances the wealthy have contracted..." Menges (1968) 
The quote above captures what elite theory embraced to underpin this piece entails. Elite theory developed in the 
field of sociology, help "explain the behaviour of men in social setting", (Duru, (2012). This was to be extended 
to politics later as two Italian sociologists, Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) and Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941), 
developed elite theory as a framework of analysis in political science. As Duru (2012) noted, the central message 
of elite theory is simply that “there may exist in many societies a minority of the population which takes the 
major decisions in the society”. The need to effectively manage the inevitable rancor in the socio-political setting 
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in the society due to hierarchical differentiation can arguably be seen as the reason why the elite theory was 
developed first in sociology to explain class differentiation and how societal decision making is processed. From 
the brief expose on elite theory, its clear common interest keeps elite class in place. This is evidenced in the 
artificial hurdles often created that prevent people from coming into the elite class. This presupposes that the 
elite group would be monolithic since single interest unites them. This is however not the case in the Nigeria as 
the Nigerian elites pursues ethnic based interest rather than common/single interest as seen in other climes, (Obi, 
2004, Otite, 2007). Being ethnic bound; Nigerian elites pursues goals that promotes sectional rather than national 
interest and consequently, leaves expected national development in unattended.   
 
The narratives this births, is that of critical issues of identity and survival in a multi-cultural society like Nigeria 
where patronage politics earlier noted, tilts policy formulation towards furthering largely ethnic rather than 
national interest. Consequently, the Nigerian elite is able to mobilize and manipulate ethnic sentiment needed to 
further primordial interest that runs contrary to national interest of development. As often seen and buoyed by 
pervasive corruption and malignant culture of impunity, elites from a particular region, pitches their political tent 
with their kinsmen, not minding whether or not such kinsman, is capable. Trial of Mr Demiji Bankole, former 
House of Representatives speaker for corruption related offences, took both ethnic and religious twist as the 
accused relied on both ethnic and religious support to wave off the accusation. He alleged that he was been 
persecuted because he is a Muslim and westerner. This tended to shroud the main issue as vexious issue of 
religion and ethnicity, was introduced in an attempted to overshadow the crime he allegedly committed. This 
manifests a peculiar trait of the Nigerian elite class as they tend to abandon their collective interest and embrace 
sectional interest that leaves both the common man and national development in deplorable condition.  
Other   features of the Nigerian elites, is profound incompetence and insensitivity to the plight of the people as 
well as penchant for corruption which ironically, is never to benefit the sectional interest they appear to represent 
but to satiate their selfish but ignoble appetite for primitive acquisition of wealth. Volumes of abandoned 
regional projects by the very elites that uses regional support as bargaining chips, is mind boggling, Eghweree 
and Otoghile, (2012). In a twist, they use ill-gotten money to maintain retinue of ethnic based supporters that 
comes handy when there is a fight at the national level for political appointment as a leeway to favourable 
resource space in the federal system that many sees largely as defective Ikeji, (2011) and Agbo, (2013:20). 
Desirous of holding on to power for life if possible, the selfish Nigerian socio-political elites do not only make 
migration to the elite class difficult, they perfect plans for their children to be recruited as their replacement in 
the elite class. This reinforce the self-serving, rent seeking and primordial interests of the Nigerian elite class that 
weakens systemic balance as it pave way for corruption that debilitates the economy and crumble same, making 
development difficult to achieve. Examples abound. From Olusegun Obasanjo to Bola Tinubu, the quest is 
simply to fix their wards in position of authority to continue their reins. Same can also be said of Bamanga 
Tukur, whose son allegedly controls high stakes in the oil industry ably exposed by the oil subsidy crisis of 
January, 2012.  
Strong elite group interest weakens institutional capacity to combat malfeasance and put impunity induced 
corruption in check (Omeje 2006). Consequently, the entrenched interest of the elite class in Nigeria, receives 
negative public perception. They are seen as fraudsters that will escape punishment because of the general 
culture of impunity that make sanctioning of those that infringed the law, ineffective as the law remain lax. 
Consequently, “looters know that nothing will happen to them” (Ebiri, 2009:74). Ironically, the character of the 
Nigerian elite, amplify that of Nigerian leaders and African leaders by extension. In a sketch, Blaine Harden, 
former African bureau chief for the Washington Post had likened the African leader, to that of the Nigerian 
power elite. Harden’s view as echoed through the works of Szeftel (2000b:293), said it all about the Nigerian 
elite class. Harden had observed thus: 
“His face is on the money. His photograph hangs in every office in his 
realm… He names streets, football stadiums, hospitals and universities after 
himself… he undercuts pretenders to his throne. He scapegoats minorities to 
shore up popular support. He bans all political parties except the one he 
controls. He rigs elections… He blesses his home region with highways, 
schools, hospitals, housing projects, irrigation schemes, and a presidential 
mansion. He packs the civil service with his tribesmen. He awards 
uncompetitive, overpriced contracts to foreign companies, which grant him, 
his family and his associates’ large kickbacks. He manipulates price and 
import controls to weaken profitable business associates… He espouses the 
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political philosophy of whatever foreign government gives him the most 
money. He is … the richest man in the country. He buys off his oppositions 
by passing out envelopes of cash or import licenses or government land. He 
questions the patriotism of the few he cannot buy” (Szeftel 2000b:293) 
All in all, the Nigerian elite depict class of self-seeking lots that sacrifices development on the altar of greed. 
That partly explains why repeated effort at achieving development in the midst of abundant oil revenue, yields 
little results. We can thus say that attributes of the Nigerian elite aided by character of the state as well cultural 
factors are key variables that can aid deeper and broader understanding of how corruption became systemic and 
endemic at the expense of desired development in both regional and national levels in Nigeria.  
Conclusively, this piece has been able to examine development mirrored in the Nigerian context and observed 
that the nation lacks development in measurable terms despite the oil resources and effort made at achieving 
development through planning. Though slippery and inherently contested, the piece considered three 
perspectives to drive home meaning of development as a concept in the light of the Nigerian situation to so 
conclude. A synergized conceptual definition for development can thus be seen as  ‘embracing the whole gamut 
of the process that leads to the enhancement of the living standard of any society with a view to making it 
achieve acceptable minimum standard that is able to sustain life, guarantee equality and freedom needed for the 
good life’. The essence of development, which gained postwar world war one  political significance through 
Truman’s famous “point four” articulation (Rist, 2010: 71), is to better the lot of disadvantaged people. In the 
face of oil wealth, many still live below the poverty line in Nigeria. This brings the issue of oil politics and the 
development dynamics equally considered in this study. The piece noted that oil politics, birth a new class of 
rent-seeking elites that though dominate the polity, but are corrupt and pursues sectional interest at the expense 
of both the nation and the envisaged development.  
Constituting the minority but powerful and influential members of the society, the elite in any society, “occupy 
powerful positions in the society with greater access to resources” (Ikelegbe, 2005). While some elites occupy 
strategic positions, others who do not but act behind the scene to shape and tilt actions and decisions of the 
occupants of privileged positions in their favour. This amplified the situation in Nigeria where the oil industry 
falls within the control of rent-seeking and prependal elites. This, the study noted, never aided the development 
process as power in the hand of the elite, was and is always to promote self-interest and not often development 
agenda as political economy reveals. The “power” and ability to “dominate” societal affairs by the elite class 
were never deployed to achieve needed development. Oil politics failed to drive the development process in 
Nigeria due to the overbearing elite influence that stifled the development process. 
Overcoming the oil politics and development debacle, needs pragmatism in terms of planning. Government 
efforts at achieving development, needs to be articulate and faithfully implement same to break the 
underdevelopment jinx plaguing the nation.  As Dode; (2010) cautioned, diversification of the economy is 
inevitable if the nation would make sense of the various development plans that appear to have defied logical 
permutations due to adverse oil politics.  
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